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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT LEE GRAY, the Natural 
Father of David Allen Gray, 
aka John Gray, Deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GALVESTON SONNY SCOTT, BEEHIVE 
LODGE OF ELKS #407, 
I.B.P.O.E.W., et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant to 
recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of David Allen Gray, 
aka John Gray. David Allen Gray and Galveston Sonny Scott were 
involved in argument and mutual combat over several days in several 
places. On New Year's Eve, 1973-1974, their final battle occurred 
at the Beehive Lodge of Elks1 New Year's Eve Ball, resulting in the 
death of David Gray. The Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor, Third Judicial District Court Judge. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Beehive Lodge of Elks and against the 
Plaintiff, "no cause of action." 
The same jury returned a verdict against Galveston Sonny 
Scott, a defendant who is not a party to the appeal, for damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Beehive Lodge of Elks requests this Court to affirm 
the judgment and jury verdict of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant's Statement of Facts is not accurate and mis-
represents the facts material to this appeal. Therefore, Respondent 
must submit the following Statement of Facts. 
On December 31, 1973, the Beehive Lodge of Elks held its 
annual New Year's Eve Ball at its Lodge at 248 West South Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. It was a dress affair, open only to Lodge 
members who had reservations, and their wives and guests. Most of 
the people present were members. [R. 522, 880] The Lodge officers 
knew over 90 per cent of the people present. [R. 884, 901] 
As the party was coming to an end and the band playing its 
last number, [R. 512] one Galveston Sonny Scott barged into the Elks 
Lodge, without authorization, and without stopping at the reservation 
desk, and proceeded toward the rear of the Lodge where a shooting 
occurred between himself and David Gray, also known as "Goofoo." 
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Also involved in the shooting were Scott's friend, Binky Coleman, 
and GrayTs friend, "Blood." When the shooting was over, Gray was 
dead. None of the participants in the shooting was a member of the 
Elks Lodge. [R. 521, 522] The party had been peaceful, without 
problems of any kind, until this incident. [R. 280, 298-299, 324, 
354, 378, 395, 398, 431, 466, 522, 848, 854, 901] 
The shooting, itself, culminated an argument between Scott 
and Gray that had existed for several days. [R. 561-567] This 
argument had seen earlier shooting between these same two individuals 
the same evening on West Second South Street [R. 565, 566] and in 
front of Gray's home, [R. 566, 588, 754, 761] and two days before 
on South Temple Street. [R. 564] Neither the officers nor members 
of the Lodge were aware that these two men had been involved in 
these shooting incidents until after the shooting on New Year's Eve. 
[R. 363, 397, 422, 849, 889, 919] 
The argument between Gray and Scott concerned a woman named 
Hortensia Williams. [R. 560] Gray claimed Miss Williams had stolen 
jewelry from him. [R. 780] Miss Williams denied this and claimed 
Gray had given her the jewelry if she would be his prostitute and work 
the streets for him. [R. 788-789] She refused to do so, and gave 
the jewelry to Sonny Scott. [R. 560, 574] Scott sold the rings. 
[R. 560, 576] Several days before any of the shooting, Gray called 
by Scott's house, wherein Miss Williams and the jewelry were discussed. 
[R. 560-561] When Gray left Scott's house, Scott's brother entered 
and informed him that Gray and Blood were outside with guns. [R. 561] 
However, apparently no shooting occurred at that time. 
-3-
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On Saturday, December 29, 1973, Miss Williams was at the 
Elks Lodge where the regular Saturday night dance was in session. 
Scott was also present. Gray, with two lady friends, arrived and 
commenced to argue with Miss Williams. [R. 562, 563] Then, Gray 
struck Miss Williams. [R. 563, 732, 782] Scott intervened, and they 
exchanged two or three blows. [R. 563] The manager of the Lodge 
stopped the fight, and told the participants to leave the Lodge. [R. 
397] The fight lasted no more than 10 to 15 seconds. [R. 737] 
Scott testified it was no big thing [R. 579] and only two or three 
blows were exchanged. [R. 563, 579] 
The Lodge manager did not know any of the participants in 
the fight, nor did he write down their names. [R. 396, 402] He 
did not consider the fight a serious problem. [R. 400] 
After Gray left the Lodge, Scott's sister came in and told 
Scott that Gray had gone to get a gun. [R. 563] Scott sent a 
friend out to bring him a gun. [R. 579] Twenty minutes later, Scott's 
friend brought him a gun. [R. 580] Within two minutes after re-
ceiving the gun, Scott left the Elks Lodge by the back door. [R. 563, 
580-581] Scott1s friend, Middleton, was with him at the time. 
Neither the manager, the band leader, nor anyone connected 
with the Lodge had any knowledge of the foregoing. They had not 
seen nor heard the talk of guns at any time. [R. 363, 401, 580, 
768-769, 777, 786] Even Middleton, Scottfs friend, did not know 
Scott had a gun until they were going out the back door of the Lodge, 
at which time he saw it for the first time. [R. 738, 746, 768] 
By the time Scott and Middleton left the Lodge, the Lodge 
had closed. It had closed a few minutes early because it had been 
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a slow night and it was close to closing time. [R. 397-398] The 
band leader felt the dance closed a little early because of the 
earlier argument, but he further stated it was close to closing 
time anyway* [R. 365, 368] In any case, the dance was over and 
the Lodge closed when Scott left by the rear door. Gray, by this 
time, had been gone from the Lodge 20 to 30 minutes. [R. 536] 
Scott walked around the building to South Temple Street, 
where his car was parked. He saw Gray and Blood attempting to enter 
the front door of the Lodge. [R. 564, 581] However, the Lodge 
door was locked. [R. 564, 581] Then, Gray and Blood went to a 
nearby alley and started shooting at Scott. [R. 581] Scott returned 
the fire. They exchanged several shots and departed. [R. 564] 
Apparently no one was hit by gunfire at that time. This shooting 
occurred in the street and alley near the Elks Lodge. [R. 564] 
The alley serves many businesses along South Temple, including the 
Utah Bar, a nearby cafe, and the Utah State Liquor Store. [R. 403-404] 
At the time Gray and Scott were shooting at each other in 
the street and alley, the Lodge manager was inside the Lodge and did 
not hear any gunshots. [R. 394, 397] The band leader was also still 
inside the Lodge, waiting to be paid, and he did not hear any gun-
shots. [R. 364, 367-368] Hortensia Williams testified that she was 
in the ladies1 restroom and did hear shots. [R. 789-790] She did 
not, however, know where the shots came from nor who was involved, 
nor when they occurred in relationship to the earlier argument. 
[R. 787, 789] The restroom is situated in that part of the Lodge 
next to the alley where the shooting occurred. [Ex. 1-P] 
-5-
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The band leader did not know about the shooting until after 
he left the Lodge and was so informed outside, [R. 363] The police 
were investigating the matter at that time. [R. 364] The band 
leader did not know who was involved in that shooting incident. 
[R. 367-368] 
The manager of the Lodge did not hear about the shooting 
until some unknown person entered the Lodge and informed him there 
had been a shooting out in the alley. [R. 399] This occurred 20 
to 30 minutes after Gray and Scott had left. [R. 397, 399] The 
manager did not investigate the shooting in the alley, and did not 
know who was involved. [R. 397, 400] The police investigated the 
said incident. [R. 364] 
Two days later, on New Year!s Eve, December 31, 1973, Scott 
and Gray shot at one another again on several occasions. Scott 
drove down to West Second South Street, in Salt Lake City, and saw 
Gray and Blood standing on the street. [R. 565, 584] Scott shot 
three times at them and yelled that they were going to have it out 
that night. [R. 566, 586] Gray shot back at Scott. [R. 585, 735] 
Scott left to obtain more ammunition. Then, with Mr. Middleton, 
he went to Grayfs house. [R. 566] There, Scott and Gray again ex-
changed gunfire. [R. 566, 587-588, 735] 
No one connected with the Elks Lodge was aware that this 
shooting was going on between Scott and Gray on New Yearfs Eve. 
Nor was anyone connected with the Elks Lodge aware that Scott and 
Gray had shot at each other outside of the Elks Lodge on the previous 
Saturday. [R. 363, 397, 401, 422, 889, 911-912, 919] 
-6-
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Scott then went to the 13th Floor of the Travelodge, where 
he spent the rest of the evening celebrating New Year's Eve. [R. 568] 
Afterward, he and Middleton drove to the Elks Lodge. [R. 568] As 
they pulled up in front of the Lodge, Scott's sister approached him 
and told him that Gray was inside. [R. 569] Scott took a pistol 
from the glove compartment, stuck it in his belt, [R. 595] and told 
Middleton to park the car across the street. [R. 595, 766] 
At this time, the Elks celebration was almost over, and the 
last dance had been announced. [R. 512, 538, 910-911, 912] The 
band was playing the last tune. [R. 512, 538] People had been 
leaving for some time. [R. 538, 901, 912-913] Until this time, 
the Elks Lodge celebration had been peaceful, without incident. 
Every single witness, including all of plaintiff's witnesses, testi-
fied that the Elks' New Year's Eve party had been peaceful, without 
fights or problems. No one had seen guns or heard the mention of 
such. No one noticed anything to suggest there would be trouble. 
[R. 280, 298-299, 324, 354, 378, 395, 398, 431, 466, 522, 848, 854, 
901] 
Scott then entered the Elks Lodge. He entered without author-
ization. [R. 535A (page unnumbered in transcript), 538, 553] Scott 
did not stop at the reservation desk, but, rather, barged past the 
desk and its attendant, Floyd Atkins. [R. 596] Floyd Atkins saw 
Scott enter, but could not stop him. [R. 924, 926] 
Scott testified that as he entered the Lodge, his gun was 
in his coat. [R. 603] One of his friends saw him and grabbed him; 
however, his friend then saw the gun in his coat and let him go. 
[R. 569] No one else present saw this incident between Scott and 
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his friend. The band leader, who was situated near the front 
door on the bandstand, did not see the incident. [R. 354-355, 
360-361] 
Scott went toward the rear of the Lodge [R. 570] (some wit-
nesses say he ran toward the rear [R. 285]) when he heard gunshots 
coming from where Gray was standing. He also saw flashes from 
Grayfs hand. [R. 570, 602] Scott testified he took out his own 
gun and fired back. [R. 570, 602-603] The band leader testified 
that the first shots were fired from the rear to the front. [R. 340, 
357] Some witnesses say Gray fired first. [R. 792, 831] Other 
witnesses indicated Scott fired first. [R. 460] Scott saw Gray go 
down, and he and his friend then backed out of the Lodge, firing 
their guns all the way. [R. 571] 
The shooting occurred very quickly and without warning. [R, 
466, 848] Sylvester Jones, a member of the Lodge, testified that 
it all happened so quickly there was nothing anyone could do to 
prevent it. [R. 466, 472-473] (Jones was, incidentally, a trained 
security guard employed at the Salt Lake International Airport 
[R. 469] but not acting as such at the Elks Lodge.) He testified 
that even if he had been on duty as a security guard, he could not 
have prevented this shooting. [R. 472-473] Other Lodge officers 
testified that it all happened so quickly that nothing could be 
done. [R. 437] The doorman said that Scott did not stop at the 
desk, but went right into the Lodge, and people started running out. 
[R. 924] Scott's friend, Middleton, testified that he let Scott 
out of the car in front of the Lodge, and merely made a U-turn to 
-8-
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park on the other side of the street and had not yet parked, when 
he heard the shooting. [R. 766] 
Two of plaintiff's witnesses testified that there was nothing 
to indicate that a problem of any kind was going to occur until 
someone yelled, ffMy God, he's got a gun," and then the shooting 
started. [R. 285, 324-325, 380] Even then, one of plaintiff's 
witnesses thought the shots were New Year's Eve poppers and not 
gunshots. [R. 324] 
Witnesses testified that after the shooting, they saw Blood 
go through Gray's clothing and remove something from his person. 
[R. 304, 326, 842-843] Some of the witnesses could not identify 
what was removed. [R. 304, 326] One witness, however, saw Blood 
remove a gun from Gray's body. [R. 793] 
The police arrived and investigated. The police found 13 
live reloaded bullets and two empty bullet casings in Gray's pocket. 
They also found a Beehive membership card, but could not recall 
whose name was upon it, if anyone's. [R. 725-727] (The police 
officer was instructed by the Court to retrieve this card from the 
police evidence room and return it to Court. [R. 728] However, 
the officer did not return to Court. Appellant's attorney informed 
the Court that the officer had advised him that the card was not 
there. [R. 944]) 
Until the shooting, the Elks Lodge celebration had been 
peaceful. Except for a minor argument between two girls ten minutes 
earlier, [R. 339-340] every single witness, including those witnesses 
called by the plaintiff, testified that the party was peaceful, 
-9-
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without any trouble of any kind, the entire night. [R. 280, 298-
299, 324, 354, 378, 395, 398, 431, 466, 522, 848, 854, 901] The 4 
party had commenced at 10:00 p.m., and the shooting occurred at 
1:50 a.m., nearly four hours later, at closing time. None of the 
witnesses, during the course of the evening, had seen any guns. i 
[R. 325-326, 431, 850] 
Contrary to the claim of the Appellant in his Statement of 
Facts, the argument ten minutes earlier, between the two girls, I 
had no connection with the later shooting. [R. 339] That argument 
was solved by the band leader informing the girls that the party 
had been very peaceful, and for them to take their problem outside. < 
That was ten minutes before Scott even arrived or the shooting in 
question occurred. [R. 339-340] All witnesses testified the 
shooting occurred quickly, without warning. [R. 466, 472-473, 766, { 
848] 
The Elks New Year's Eve party was not open to the public. 
[R. 539, 855, 882-883, 905-907] Only members with reservations, 
and their wives and guests, were allowed. [R. 538, 855, 901] Only 
members of the Lodge could make reservations. [R. 538-539] The 
public was not allowed. [R. 539] Even members who did not have 
reservations were not allowed. [R. 539, 907] The Lodge officers 
knew more than 90 per cent of the people there. [R. 884, 901] 
A close check was made of reservations. [R. 549, 906] Hands were 
stamped to allow re-entrance into the Lodge in the event one had to 
leave. [R. 278, 379, 924, 926] The front reservation desk was 
-10-
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manned during the entire night, including the time when Scott 
entered the Lodge. [R. 907, 910, 916, 923, 924-925] 
The lighting in the Lodge consisted of bright lights and 
dim lights. The bright lights were off at times, leaving only the 
dim lights for atmosphere. [R. 281, 304, 336] The switch to the 
lights was by the band. The band leader had standing instructions 
to turn the bright lights on if any problem arose. [R. 336, 517] 
At the time of the shooting, the bright lights were off, but the 
dim lights were on. [R. 304, 837] The lights were never completely 
off. [R. 336] One witness who testified that the lights were "off" 
later testified that she meant the "bright lights were off." [R. 281, 
304] At the time of the shooting, while the lights were dim, the 
band leader was still able to see the entire length of the Lodge 
and identify those at the other end. [R. 355-356.] 
The rear door of the Lodge was not locked. It was in use 
all evening by the ladies working in the kitchen, where the door 
was located. The door can always be opened from the inside by merely 
pushing on the bar. [R. 848, 854] 
The only persons in attendance at the Elks Lodge on New 
Year's Eve who had knowledge of the prior problems between Scott 
and Gray, as well as the prior shootings, were Gray, himself, and 
his friend, Blood. [R. 397, 889, 919] Not one person connected 
with the Lodge had any knowledge of the shooting between Scott and 
Gray in the alley outside the Elks Lodge on Saturday night, or on 
West Second South early on New Year's Eve, or in front of Gray's 
house on New Year's Eve. [R. 299, 363, 397, 422, 889, 911-912, 919] 
-11-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Elks Lodge did not hire any armed, uniformed security 
guards for the New Year's Eve Ball. The officers and members did 
not feel that security was a problem. [R. 500, 504, 912] The Elks 
Lodge had never experienced a shooting, knifing, or serious fight 
at any of its special functions in all of the years of its existence. 
[R. 481, 524, 846, 853-854, 857-858, 860-862, 886, 890-891, 912] 
One of plaintiff's witnesses testified she had been going to Elks 
Lodge functions for over twenty years, and the Elks Lodge was con-
sidered one of the better places to go. [R. 298-299] One elderly 
lady member testified that she was proud that she could feel as 
safe at the Lodge as she did in her own living room. [R. 846] 
Nathaniel Johnson, a well-educated chemist and Army Reserve Colonel 
[R. 556, 902-903] and chairman of the New Year's Eve Ball, said that 
there was no need for security guards. [R. 543] 
All members of the Lodge had responsibility for maintaining 
peace and order among Lodge members. [R. 413, 503, 515] The Antler 
Guard, a ceremonial office, also had official responsibility for 
keeping order and peace among the members at official functions; 
however, the Antler Guard is not a security guard. [R. 428-430, 
547, 554-555, 892] He would not be expected to stop serious fights 
or gunfights if they were to occur. [R. 408] 
The Appellant attempts to make a point that Anderson Pearson 
was a security guard and was downstairs at the time of the shooting. 
However, Anderson Pearson was not a security guard, but was the 
Antler Guard, and, he went downstairs at the end of the party to 
eat, [R. 413] Anderson Pearson testified that he was supposed to 
-12-
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receive further training following a discussion with James Dooley, 
the leader of the Lodge. [R. 410] James Dooley testified he recalled 
no discussion with Pearson as to training as a security guard, but 
stated there may have been a conversation concerning karate lessons. 
[R. 885] A karate expert had given a demonstration at the Elks 
Lodge, and many of the members, including Anderson Pearson, were 
interested in taking lessons. [R. 885] Pearson never participated 
in the lessons. In any case, Anderson Pearson testified that in 
all of his experience with the Elks Lodge, he had never experienced 
a serious fight, shooting, or knifing at the Elks Lodge. [R. 427-428, 
429] He further testified he had never experienced a fight or an 
argument that he did not feel capable of handling and was not 
personally able to handle and solve. [R. 429-430] 
The Beehive Lodge of Elks is not just another private club. 
The Elks Lodge has been organized in the Salt Lake Valley for fifty 
years. [Ex. 28-D] Most of its members are middle aged or older. 
The oldest member is 73 years of age, and the average age is 54.6 years 
[Ex. 30-D, Roster of Members] (As of the date of the incident.) 
Its many committees are organized for the purpose of giving scholar-
ships, helping the needy, special celebrations for Mother's Day, 
Father's Day, Labor Day, providing family outings, a children's 
Christmas party, churchgoing activities, as well as the annual New 
Year's Eve Ball. [R. 860-861, 871-879; Ex. 27-D] 
In addition, the Elks Lodge maintains its Lodge open for its 
members seven days a week, wherein members with guests are welcome 
for lunch, dinner, dancing, drinks, card playing, and socializing. 
-13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
« 
[R. 524-525, 880] Whereas the Elks Lodge has never experienced any 
problems or fights at any of its special functions, [R. 481, 524] 4 
it may have an occasional argument or fight during its regular hours. 
The leader of the Lodge, James Dooley, testified that the Lodge 
may have five or six fracases a year, but that these fracases are I 
not serious, but more like family arguments, [R. 481, 524] and are 
solved by the Lodge members without the necessity of outside help. 
[R. 887] Other officers confirmed that the only problems they had I 
experienced were minor problems that were solved by the Lodge. [R. 891] 
The only exception to the foregoing occurred approximately 
three months prior to the New Yearfs Eve Ball in question, when, < 
during a weekday card game, one card player shot another in the leg. 
[R. 486] This occurred during the week and not at any special 
function of the Lodge. [R. 525] Mr. Dooley was present in the { 
Lodge at that time, but did not see the shooting or the events leading 
up to it. He merely heard the shots, [R. 525-526] and called the 
police. [R. 486] The two card players were banned forever from 
the Lodge, and have never returned. [R. 487, 887, Ex. 30-D, Minute 
Book.] James Dooley's first knowledge of that shooting was as it 
occurred and not beforehand, as stated by AppellantTs Brief. [R. 
485-486] 
The official Minute Book of the Elks Lodge [Ex. 30-D] shows 
no other such incidents, nor any fights of any kind, for the one 
year period prior to the New Year's Eve in question. [Ex. 30-D] 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 36. 
The principal question of fact for jury determination was 
whether or not the Beehive Lodge of Elks exercised reasonable and 
ordinary care, under the circumstances, in regard to its members and 
their guests during the New Year's Eve Ball. 
The testimony shows that Scott and Gray were involved in 
argument and mutual combat for several days. They had shot at each 
other on three different occasions, in three different locations, 
during the two days prior to the night in question. 
The testimony clearly shows that not one single officer or 
member of the Elks Lodge, nor the band leader, had any knowledge of 
the prior shooting episodes between these two men. [R. 363, 397, 
424, 891, 919] The closest the Lodge ever came to the difficulty 
between Scott and Gray was on Saturday, two days before, when the 
two men argued inside the Lodge and exchanged two or three blows. 
At that time, they were told by the Lodge manager to leave. [R. 397] 
That fight was not considered serious by either the manager or by 
Scott. [R. 400, 579] The manager did not know the identity of 
Scott or Gray, nor did he take down their names. [R. 396, 402] 
The manager did not see guns nor hear talk of guns. [R. 401] The 
manager did not hear the shooting which occurred 20 to 30 minutes 
later, outside of the Lodge in the alley or street. [R. 394, 397] 
He merely was told by someone else that a shooting had occurred, but 
-15-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
he did not know who was involved in that shooting. [R. 397, 399] 
The band leader did not hear the shooting outside, but only heard 4 
about it later from others. [R. 363, 367-368] He did not know the -
identity of the persons involved in that shooting. [R. 363] Hor-
tensia Williams was still in the Lodge in the restroom (located next 4 
to the alley where the shooting allegedly occurred) and claimed 
she heard some gunshots, but she also did not know where the shots 
came from or who was involved in that shooting. [R. 787-789] i 
There was nothing whatsoever about the Scott-Gray argument 
on Saturday night to suggest to anyone connected with the Lodge 
that these same two men would shoot at each other at any other time, * 
and certainly nothing to suggest in any way that at the formal New 
Year's Eve Ball, attended only by members and guests with reservations, 
Scott would burst in at the end of the party and shoot Gray, or, for i 
that matter, that any shooting of any kind would occur. 
The Elks Club had never in its history experienced a fight, 
or shooting, or violence of any kind at any special function, such 
as the New Year's Eve Ball. All prior special functions of the 
Lodge, including the New Year's Eve Balls in prior years, had 
always been peaceful. [R. 481, 524, 846, 853-854, 857-858, 860-862, 
886, 890-891, 912] The New Year's Eve Ball in question was peaceful, 
without problems of any kind, until the shooting occurred during 
the closing band number. [R. 280, 298-299, 324, 354, 378, 395, 398, 
431, 466, 522, 848, 854, 901] Fights or arguments occasionally 
occur at the Lodge at other times, but such have never been serious 
enough to call the police. The only exception was one shooting three 
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months earlier between two card players. However, the police 
were called and those two card players were banned by the Lodge 
forever and have never been seen since. 
The Respondent believes it was entitled to a Dismissal at 
the end of the plaintiff's case, and certainly to a Directed Verdict 
at the end of the evidence. Its motions were denied. 
In 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, Sec. 63, it is stated under 
the general heading "Duty to Anticipate Criminal Acts" as follows: 
No person owes a duty to anyone to anticipate 
that a crime will be committed by another, and 
to act upon that belief. It has been held that 
no one, under ordinary circumstances, is chargeable 
with damages because he has not anticipated a 
crime by some third person. However, a duty to 
afford protection of another from a criminal 
assault or wilful act of violence of a third 
person may arise, at least under some circumstances, 
if that duty is voluntarily assumed, such as by 
contract. 
In Popovich v. Pechkurow, 145 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio, 1956) a patron 
sued a tavern for injuries sustained when he was shot by another 
patron. He claimed the tavern owners were negligent in failing to 
call the police after being warned of the patron's intention to 
get a rifle. A directed verdict in favor of the tavern owner was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. In that case, the assaulter 
left the tavern, informing everyone he was going to get his gun, 
and come back and shoot everyone in the tavern. In about fifteen 
minutes, he returned with his gun and, while standing outside the 
door, fired several shots through the glass panel. The Supreme 
Court, in affirming the directed verdict, stated: 
The general rule is that when, between negligence 
and the occurrence of an injury, there intervenes 
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a wilful, malicious, and criminal act of 
a third person which causes the injury but 
was not intended by the negligent person | 
and could not have been foreseen by him, 
the causal chain between the negligence and 
the accident is broken. . . 
Wrongful acts of independent third persons, 
not actually intended by the defendant, are 4 
not regarded by the law as natural consequences 
of his wrong, and he is not bound to anticipate 
the general probability of such acts, any 
more than a particular act by this or that 
individual. This rule applies a fortiori 
to criminal acts. I 
In Rosensteil v. Lisdas, 456 P.2d 61 (Ore. 1969) a restaurant 
patron was shot and injured by persons who had come in from the 
street to continue their fight. The police testified there had been * 
a previous violent altercation between the same individuals in the 
same restaurant a year before. They also testified they were called 
to the restaurant on numerous occasions for different drunks and * 
fights. Also, a waitress testified that during the thirteen days 
she had worked immediately prior to the night in question, there 
had been "a few hassles.M In finding in favor of the owner of the 
restaurant, the Oregon Supreme Court stated the following: 
Even if a restaurant owner has the duty under 
some circumstances to employ personnel who 
are capable of keeping order and thus protect 
his patrons from injury resulting from the 
foreseeable conduct of his patrons, he is not 
required to employ such personnel for the con-
tingency that outsiders will elect to use the 
restaurant rather than the street as their 
battleground. The fact that the Hale brothers 
had previously been in the restaurant gave 
defendants1 employees no warning that they 
would stir up trouble and suddenly return to 
burst into the restaurant. It is the respon-
sibility of the public police to quell such 
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disturbances whether they occur on the street 
or in a restaurant. And even where previously 
violence has swept in from the streets, we do 
not think that it should be the duty of a 
businessman operating a restaurant to risk 
his own life or employ others to risk theirs 
in order to protect bystanders who happen to 
be in the restaurant rather than on the street. 
That is a function which he should be able 
to leave to government police. 
The Court concluded: 
The fact that previous disturbances had occurred 
in the restaurant would not impose upon defen-
dants the duty to prepare against disturbances 
which originated in conflict elsewhere and 
which result in harm to defendant's patrons 
simply because the victim without any warning 
to defendants chose to use defendants' restaurant 
as a place of refuge. 
In Stevenson v. Kansas City, 187 Kan. 705, 360 P.2d 1 (1961) 
a patron at a wrestling exhibition was assaulted and injured by 
a man who robbed her on the premises. The plaintiff calimed that 
the defendants failed to provide her with a safe place to attend 
the performance and further failed to provide sufficient police or 
guards. 
The Court, in finding in favor of the defendants who were 
conducting the wrestling match, stated in quoting 65 C.J.S., Neg-
ligence, Sec. Ill, as follows: 
Defendant's negligence is too remote to 
constitute the proximate cause where an inde-
pendent illegal willful, malicious, or criminal 
act of a third person, which could not reason-
ably have been foreseen, and without which 
such injury would not have been sustained, 
intervenes. A person is not bound to anticipate 
the malicious, wilful, or criminal acts of 
others by which damage is inflicted. . . 
The Court continued in citing from one of its earlier decisions: 
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We all anticipate pocket picking when the 
circus comes, and housebreaking during fair 
week, but the circus and the fair are not 4 
the causes of such crimes. We know, too, 
that should a housebreaker be discovered in 
the act of committing burglary, he might do 
violence to a person interrupting his 
depredation. But if, knowing the city to 
be infested with such characters, we go out 4 
for the evening leaving the back door unlocked 
and leaving a servant in the house, omission 
to lock the door is not the cause of the 
burglary, should one occur, or the cause 
of injury to the servant who tries to inter-
cept commission of the crime. The cause of 4 
injury originates with the burglar, whose 
entrance into the house was not obstructed 
by a locked door. 
The Court continued, at page 6: 
By its own contents and allegations, plain-
tiff's petition charges defendants with a 
degree of negligence that would tend to make 
them her insurers from the time she entered 
the Memorial Building until she departed . 
therefrom, but no such duty is placed on 
the defendants when this case is tested by 
the foregoing authorities in our jurisdiction. 
To apply such a high degree of vigilance would 
make a public amusement impossible because 
of the expense of guards, time for searching
 ( 
customers to discover possible weapons, etc. 
To foresee that plaintiff while attending 
the wrestling matches would be assaulted at 
the hour of 11:00 p.m. at the particular spot 
on the particular ramp on the way to the
 i 
particular rest room in the Memorial Building 
in Kansas City would indeed require imaginative 
foresight and such is not tye type of fore-
seeability required under our law. Only the 
standard of the reasonable and prudent man, 
as set out above, is required. 
In Strong v. Granite Furniture Co., 77 Utah 292, 294 P. 303 
(1930) the plaintiff purchased furniture from the defendant and had 
it in possession in his home. He failed to make payments. While 
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he was out of town, the furniture store entered his home and 
repossessed their furniture. Later, thieves entered the same 
home and removed the rest of the plaintiff's personal property. 
Plaintiff sued the furniture store for the loss to the thieves, 
claiming the furniture store knew the plaintiff was out of town, 
and yet, left a window unsecured. The Court stated: 
Assuming that upon this evidence the jury 
was justified in finding that the defendant's 
agents removed the nails which were driven 
into the window frame to prevent the window 
from being raised, and that such nails were 
not replaced, can it be said that such acts 
constitute the proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs' losing their household goods? 
Generally speaking, TTthe proximate cause of 
an injury is the primary moving cause without 
which it would not have been inflicted, but 
which, in the natural and probable sequence 
of events, and without the intervention of 
any new or independent cause,%produces the 
injury . . ." 
The Court in the above case then stated the applicable law 
as found in Corpus Juris, as follows: 
Defendant's negligence is too remote to 
constitute the proximate cause where an inde-
pendent illegal act of a third person, which 
could not reasonably have been foreseen, and 
without which such injury would not have been 
sustained, intervenes. A person is not bound 
to anticipate the malicious or criminal acts 
of others by which damage is inflicted, even 
though they are the acts of children. But 
where an independent illegal act was of a 
nature which might have been anticipated, and 
which it was the defendant's duty to provide 
against, he will be liable for a breach of 
such duty, notwithstanding the production 
of injuries by the intervention of an act 
of the character described. 
The Supreme Court, testing the above rule, stated: 
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Tested by the rule of law just quoted, it 
cannot be said that the leaving of nails 
out of the window frame in plaintiffs' dwelling ( 
was the proximate cause, or a proximate con-
tributing cause, of the loss of plaintiffs1 
household goods. Obviously, the leaving of 
the window in plaintiffs1 home unfastened did 
not produce the injury complained of. The 
proximate cause of plaintiffs' loss was the | 
felonious acts of the unknown person. 
It is argued that the negligence of the 
defendant was the proximate cause or a proximate 
contributing cause of the loss, because, except 
for its negligence, plaintiffs' dwelling would i 
not have been invaded. This is pure speculation. 
Burglars are not necessarily deterred from 
entering unoccupied houses merely because the 
windows cannot be raised. There is no evidence 
which shows, or tends to show, that the 
unknown person or persons who removed plaintiffs' i 
household goods gained entrance to plaintiffs' 
dwelling by raising the window, or that the 
window was unfastened when the unknown person 
or persons entered, or that they would not 
have entered if the window had been fastened. 
The evidence in this case is insufficient to ' 
support a finding that any act of the defendant 
was the proximate cause or a proximate con-
tributing cause of the loss of plaintiffs' house-
hold goods. 
In Huddleston v. Clark, 186 Kan. 209, 349 P.2d 888 (Kan. 1960) * 
a patron was shot in a public tavern by a neighboring businessman. 
The businessman had been refused service and had told the waitress 
he was going to return and shoot her. This same man had made that 
same statement many times before. He was escorted out of the business 
and the owner told him to stay out, wherein the man threatened to 
get a gun and return and "shoot the place up." He did return, 
and during the shooting injured a patron. The Trial Court sustained 
defendants' demurrer. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed, stating: 
-22-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
While he sometimes spoke in a loud voice and 
used profane language toward defendants' 
employees when they refused to sell him beer, 
he had never previously harmed anyone in 
defendants' place of business. It was not 
shown, under the evidence as presented, that 
when Donohue was ordered to and did leave 
defendants' premises earlier in the afternoon 
of the day in question, either defendants or 
their employees believed there was a reasonable 
probability he would return with a gun and 
would almost immediately upon re-entering the 
establishment, commit an assault on one or 
more of the customers by his promiscuous shooting. 
Most of the above cases concern the duty of public places 
of entertainment. But in our case, we have a private lodge. The 
above cited law would be even more applicable in our case. 
While the Court agreed there was no evidence that the Lodge 
had any reason to anticipate that a shooting would occur on New 
Year's Eve, the Court felt that a question of fact did exist as to 
whether or not the Lodge exercised reasonable and ordinary care 
under the circumstances in regard to its members and their guests 
at the New Year's Eve Ball. Therefore, the Court submitted the 
case to the jury. Among the instructions were the following, which 
we set forth verbatim for the convenience of the Court: 
Instruction No. 10 
The terms "ordinary", and "proximate cause", 
as used in these instructions are defined as 
follows: 
A. "Ordinary care" is that degree of care which 
a reasonably prudent person would use under the 
same or similar circumstances • T?y0rdinary care" 
implies the exercise of reasonable diligence and 
such watchfulness, caution and foresight as under 
all the circumstances of the particular case 
would be exercised by a reasonably careful, 
prudent person: 
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B. By "proximate cause11 is meant that cause 
which in a natural, continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any new cause, produced the injury 
and without which the injury would not have 
occurred. (Emphasis added) 
Instruction No. 15 
As used in these instructions, the term "neg-
ligence" means the failure to do what a reasonable 
and prudent person would have done under the 
circumstances involved, or doing what a reasonable 
and prudent person would not have done under such 
circumstances. The faulty conduct may lie either 
in acting or in not acting. The standard oT 
contuct required in any given case is dictated 
and measured by the immediate requirements of 
the occasion as determined from the existing facts 
and circumstances. (Emphasis added) 
You will note, that the person whose conduct we 
set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily 
cautious individual, nor the exceptionally skillful 
one, but a person of reasonable and ordinary 
prudence. While exceptional caution and skill 
are to be admired and encouraged, the law does not 
demand them under the general standards of conduct. 
Instruction No. 27 
The conduct of the defendant Beehive Lodge of 
Elks and/or the individual defendants who are 
officers, agents, or trustees of the said Beehive 
Lodge of Elks need not have been the sole cause 
of the harm of injury or death sustained by the 
decedent David Allen Gray. If you find the said 
defendants are negligence and if you further find 
that the defendantsy negligence is a proximate 
cause of the injuries and death sustained by 
the said decedent, the defendants would be liable 
for the damages which were caused by the wrongful 
death of the decedent; even though the death 
was brought about by the concurrent or substantially 
simultaneously act or operation of the efforts of 
both of the defendants' negligent conduct and 
another force or cause such as the conduct of the 
defendant Galveston Sonny Scott. (Emphasis added) 
Instruction No. 28. 
There may be more than one proximate cause of an 
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injury or death; and each of the persons whose 
conduct did in fact constitute a proximate cause 
of the injury or death would be liable for the 
said injuries and/or death. (Emphasis added) 
Instruction No, 34 
You are instructed that in determining one person's 
duty to another, foresight, not hindsight, is the 
standard by which one's duty of care is to be 
judged. The existence of actionable negligence 
depends, not upon what actually happened, but upon 
what reasonably might have been expected to happen. 
Negligence must be determined upon the facts as 
they appeared at the time, and not by a judgment 
from actual consequences which were not then to 
be apprehended by a prudent and competent man. 
(Emphasis added) 
Instruction No. 35 
A person or persons or private club who are 
exercising due care have a right to assume that 
others will also perform their duties under the 
law, and each has a right to rely and act on that 
assumption unless, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, one observes.or should observe something 
to warn one to the contrary. In the absence of 
such warning, it is not negligence for a person 
to"fail to anticipate, injury or death which can 
result only from a violation of law or duty by 
another. (Emphasis added) 
Instruction No. 36 
You are instructed that a private lodge or assoc-
iation., as well as its officers, has no duty to 
anyone to anticipate that a crime will be committed 
by another person, and to act upon that belief. 
It is submitted that based upon the nature and age of the 
membership of the Lodge, the Lodge's long trouble-free history, the 
exclusiveness and nature of the New Year's Eve Ball, the peacefulness 
of the celebration until the end, and the lack of notice or knowledge 
of the prior violence between Scott and Gray, the Beehive Lodge of 
Elks had no reason, nor duty, to anticipate that there would be a 
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shooting at the Elks Lodge during or at the end of the New Year's 
Eve Ball, i 
Therefore, the Court correctly instructed the jury that the 
Lodge had no duty to anticipate that this crime would occur. The 
Court correctly instructed the jury that the Lodge had a duty of * 
reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances in behalf of 
its members and their guests at the New Year's Eve Ball. Whether 
or not the Lodge exercised reasonable and ordinary care under the * 
circumstances was a question for the jury, and the jury rendered 
its verdict. 
Appellant cites as authority Industrial Park Businessmen's 
Club, Inc. v. Buck, 479 S.W.2d 842 (1972) as being nvery much in 
point." However, that case is not in point. The Court stated 
therein that the nattackerft had made himself obnoxious to everyone 
present for 6 1/2 hours, and despite his conduct, had continuously 
been served alcohol, and that the manager of the tavern was drunk 
and left the tavern early in disgust at what had been going on, and 
that the owner, as well as the manager, knew persons of bad character 
were present and around with guns. None of those facts existed in 
the case presently before the bar. That case has no application. 
The only other case cited by Appellant was Samson v. Saginaw 
Professional Building, Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843, wherein 
the Court stated that the only issues on appeal were (1) the issue 
of a landlord's duty to protect one tenant against the mental 
patients visiting another tenant, and (2) whether or not probate 
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records of a defendant should have been admitted into evidence. 
(P. 846) Furthermore, the evidence was clear that the landlord 
not only knew of the mental patients visiting one tenant, but the 
landlord had received specific complaints from tenants over the 
problem. None of these facts, nor equivalent facts, exist in the 
case at bar. That case has no application. 
The Appellant, in his Brief, listed 23 "findings of fact" 
which he believes the jury was justified in finding from the evidence. 
However, most of the 23 findings do not accurately reflect the 
evidence. For this reason, Respondent is compelled to reply to 
each of the 23 points as follows: 
1. Appellant states there are several fracases or fights 
on the Elks premises each year. This statement is basically true. 
However, the testimony was that these were family type arguments 
that were always solved by the Lodge. [R. 481, 524, 891] 
2. Appellant claims that during the shooting three months 
before New Year's Eve, that all the events leading up to the shooting 
were done in the presence of James E. Dooley. This is not true. 
Dooley testified that he was upstairs and heard the shooting which 
occurred downstairs. This was the first indication he had of any 
trouble between the card players. [R. 485-486, 525-526] Dooley 
immediately called the police [R. 486] and banned the participants 
from the Lodge forever, and they have never returned. [R. 487, 887] 
3. Appellant states that the shooting was well known to 
members of the Lodge. This is basically true. The prior shooting 
was known to members of the Lodge inasmuch as the two card players 
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were banned forever from the Lodge, [R. 887, Ex. 30-D, Minutes] 
4. Appellant claims that Dooley asked Pearson, a member of 4 
the Antler Guard--"the Lodge's internal security division, to go 
for more training to be able to better perform his duties during 
the New Year's Eve celebration," This is not true. While Pearson 4 
did believe he was supposed to receive more training at the request 
of Mr, Dolley, Dooley stated that he did not have such a conversation, 
but that they may have discussed Pearson's taking karate lessons, i 
which many of the members were interested in, following a demonstration 
at the Lodge. [R. 885] Furthermore, there was never any testimony 
by Pearson or anyone else in regard to the necessity of security * 
training for Mthe New Year's Eve celebration," Furthermore, the 
Antler Guard is not the nLodgeTs internal security division." 
[R. 428-430, 547, 554-555, 892]
 K < 
5. Appellant claims Pearson had no training to deal with the 
"shootings and knifings,11 and for this reason he was being sent for 
A 
special training. This is not true. There was never any discussion 
concerning "shootings or knifings" between Pearson and Dooley. 
The testimony cited by Appellant does not say what he claims it said. 
6. Appellant states there was a fight less than 48 hours 
prior to the New Year's Eve celebration, inside the Beehive Lodge, 
involving Scott, Gray, and Blood. This is basically true, but it 
should be pointed out that the manager did not know the identities 
of these three individuals involved in the fight. [R. 396, 402] 
Furthermore, he did not know who was involved in the shooting which 
occurred outside on the street 20 to 30 minutes later. [R. 397] 
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7. Appellant claims that when Scott left the Elks Lodge 
Saturday night he had a gun "which everyone saw." This is totally 
false, and a misrepresentation of the evidence. The testimony was 
to the exact opposite. The manager did not see any guns, the band 
leader did not see any guns, Hortensia Williams did not see any guns 
at any time. Middleton, Scott's companion, did not see any guns 
until Scott was going out the back door. [R. 363, 401, 500, 768-
769, 777, 786] 
8. The Appellant states that Scott and Gray returned fire 
out on the street for "several minutes." This is not accurate. 
The evidence was that Scott and Gray shot at each other, but the 
time involved is not known. Scott testified that after he was shot 
at, he returned the fire within 3 second, and then he ran. [R. 564] 
9. The Appellant states that "several persons inside the 
Lodge heard the shooting within two minutes after Scott left." This 
is not true. The manager and the band leader never did hear the 
shooting, but were informed by other persons that there had been a 
shooting, after it occurred. [R. 364, 367-368, 394, 397] The one 
witness who stated the shooting had occurred within two minutes 
later corrected her testimony to state she did not know how long 
it had occurred after Scott left. [R. 787, 789] 
10. Appellant states that "within a very few minutes after 
the shooting" several people ran in to tell Exie Gray that the 
shooting had occurred. Actually, Exie Gray, the manager, testified 
he did not hear about the shooting for 15, 20, or 30 minutes after 
it had occurred. [R. 399] 
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11. Appellant claims that after the Saturday night shootout, 
many of the members who left the dance had guns in their belts. * 
This is totally incorrect and a misrepresentation of the facts. 
No members were seen with guns on Saturday night. [R. 768, 769] 
The testimony cited by Appellant was that of Scott's companion, j 
Middleton, who testified he saw three or four people out in the 
street with guns in their hands. [R. 744] He didn't know them. 
[R. 744] He never identified them as members of the Lodge as claimed 4 
by Appellant. [R. 744] 
12. Appellant claims the Saturday night dance stopped early 
because of "this fight.ff This is not accurate. The manager of i 
the Lodge stated he closed the dance a little early because it was 
slow, and anyway, it was close to closing. [R. 397-398] The dance 
band leader stated he thought the dance closed early because of the < 
earlier fight, but that, in any case, it was close to closing. 
[R. 365, 368] 
13. The Appellant claims that Exie Gray, the manager, in- < 
formed Jim Dooley and Anderson Pearson about the fight. Actually, 
Dooley and Pearson didn't hear about the minor fight until after 
New Year's Eve. [R. 488, 889] None of them had knowledge of the l 
later shooting out on the street. [R. 424, 889] 
14. Appellant's statement is basically correct. 
15. Appellant cites the testimony of Nathaniel Johnson as 
to what he would have done had he known about the earlier fight on 
Saturday. However, Appellant failed to mention that this testimony 
was objected to as being speculative, and that this testimony was 
stricken by the trial court. [R. 921] 
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16. Appellant claims that a fight is a crime. This may 
or may not be true. A family argument of words is not a crime. 
17. Basically true. 
18. Appellant claims that James Dooley and Shelly Smith 
and other members of the Lodge knew that Gray and Scott were on 
the premises during both the Saturday night fight and the New Year's 
Eve celebration. This is not true, but a misrepresentation of the 
facts. Scott was not in attendance at the New Year's Eve celebration. 
He barged in at the end of the celebration, while the last dance 
number was being played. [R. 535 A, 538, 553, 596, 924, 926] 
Dooley did not know Gray, but was introduced to him earlier in the 
evening. Dooley did not know that Gray or Scott had been at the 
Lodge on Saturday night until he was so informed by the manager, 
after the New Year's Eve celebration. [R. 889] 
19. Appellant claims that the New Year's Eve committee knew 
that Galveston Sonny Scott was on the premises during the New Year's 
Eve celebration. This is not true and a misrepresentation of the 
facts. Galveston Sonny Scott was not present during the New Year's 
Eve celebration. He barged into the Lodge at the end of the New 
Year's Eve celebration, while the last number was being played. 
[R. 535 A, 538, 553, 596, 924, 926] 
20. Basically correct. 
21. Appellant claims that most members of the Beehive 
Lodge of Elks knew Scott. This is not quite accurate. Most of the 
members knew who Scott was, but most did not know Scott personally 
[R. 535] 
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22. Basically correct. 
23. Appellant claims that David Gray had a membership card 4 
on his person at the time of the shooting. This statement is some-
what misleading. The police found a membership card in his pocket 
following the shooting, but the police officer stated that they | 
did not know who the card belonged to or whose name was upon it. 
[R. 726-727] The records of the Lodge show that Gray was not a 
member. [Ex. 30-D] The testimony of the leaders of the Lodge i 
indicate he was not a member. [R. 521] 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court correctly in-
structed the jury that the Lodge had no duty to anticipate that this * 
crime would occur. The Court correctly instructed the jury that 
the Lodge had a duty of reasonable and ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances in behalf of its members and their guests at the New { 
Year's Eve Ball. Whether or not the Lodge exercised reasonable 
and ordinary care under the circumstances was a question for the 
jury, and the jury rendered its verdict. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING THE TESTIMONY OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS, WILLIAM GATELY. 
Appellant called as an expert witness William Gately. His 
testimony was given by proffer of proof, which was rightfully 
refused by the Court for reasons hereinafter given. 
Gately testified that he moved to Salt Lake City after the 
incident at the Elks Lodge [R. 612, 630] and had been licensed as 
a private detective in Utah 1 1/2 years after the New Year's Eve 
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in question. [R. 612, 630, 631] He admitted he had never done any 
work in private clubs in Salt Lake City. [R. 614] He admitted 
that his only security experience had been in the large cities of 
the West Coast--namely Portland and Los Angeles, [R. 631] and that 
he was not familiar with private clubs in Salt Lake City. [R- 631] 
Gately further admitted that his only experience in Portland, 
Oregon, and Los Angeles, had been with those private clubs which 
"had reputations of problems arising and situations getting out of 
hand" [R. 623] and where the patrons were between the ages of 21 
and 40. [R. 623] (Note that the members of the Beehive Lodge of 
Elks had an average age of 54.6 years at the time of this incident, 
the oldest being 73 years of age, and out of 71 members, only nine 
were under the age of 40. [Ex. 30-D, Roster of Members]) 
Gately also admitted that he was not at the Beehive Elks 
Lodge on New Year's Eve, nor even in Salt Lake City at that time, 
but on the West Coast, and had never before been in Salt Lake City 
on New Year's Eve. [R. 631] Also, he admitted that he does not 
know any member of the Elks Lodge. [R. 631] 
Gately further admitted that he is not familiar with the 
private clubs in Salt Lake City, and further admitted that he had 
never done any work in any clubs in Salt Lake City. [R. 614, 631] 
Gately claimed that some private clubs had availed themselves of 
security services, but he could not name any. [R. 614] 
Gately further admitted that he did not know the name of any 
private club presently hiring security guards in Salt Lake City. 
[R. 614] 
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Gately further admitted that for the few months that he had 
been in Salt Lake City, his primary security account had been the 
First Security Bank. [R. 616] He also admitted that in giving his 
opinion, he was not aware that the Elks Lodge had never had, at 
an official function, a fight, knifing, or shooting. He stated 
that he had thought otherwise. [R. 631] 
Gately further admitted that his expert testimony was 
clearly speculative and that he could not state one way or another 
that the shooting would not have occurred had his services been 
available. His testimony was: [R. 635] 
Q Even if there had been security guards there, 
there is no way you can say whether or not a 
shooting would have occurred, can you? 
A No. 
Q In fact Robert Kennedy was shot in a hotel 
lobby in Los Angeles surrounded by Secret Service, 
the FBI and Los Angeles Police Department, wasn't 
he? 
A That's right. 
Q And President Ford was shot at in front of a 
hotel lined with uniformed policemen up and down 
the street surrounded by the Secret Service and 
the FBI by a woman across the street; is that right? 
A That1s right. 
Q So itfs all speculation, isn't it, as to whether 
a shooting would have occurred even if guards had 
been there? 
A That's right. [R. 635] 
Gately later claimed that if he had five to six armed 
security guards there, the shooting wouldn't have happened. [R. 636] 
Based upon the above testimony of Gately, the Court refused 
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plaintiff's proffer of proof for lack of foundation and because 
the security arrangements which he described (mace, handcuffs, 
nightstick, five uniformed guards, etc.) went beyond the reasonable 
and ordinary care required, and further, that it called for a con-
clusion from him on the very issue that should have gone to the jury. 
[R. 637-638] 
The Appellant claims that Gately's testimony, at least as 
to what was available in security devices, should have been allowed. 
However, the Court rightfully refused the same, since the security 
devices described went beyond the duty this private lodge owed to 
its private members and their guests. There had been no problems 
in the history of the Lodge functions requiring security guards, 
mace, handcuffs, or night sticks. The testimony was that the Lodge 
members had always been able to handle the minor arguments that had 
occurred in the past. This was true in regard to the Saturday 
night argument between Scott and Gray inside the Lodge, wherein 
the manager broke it up and informed the participants to leave, 
which they did. Any trouble between Gray and Scott left the Lodge 
and occurred elsewhere. 
The fact that mace, guns, nightsticks, or handcuffs were 
available is immaterial. There was no duty on the part of the Elks 
Lodge to provide any of these items. And, the posting of five-
security guards, armed with mace, nightsticks and handcuffs, at the 
Elks Lodge party, who would search every person who entered, cer-
tainly would go far beyond reasonable and ordinary care, and would 
not be expected of the leadership of this Lodge. 
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Appellant further claims that since Sylvester Jones, a 
member of the Lodge who was present at the time of the shooting 
and sitting near the participants of the shooting, was allowed to 
testify, that Gately should have also been allowed to testify-
However, Sylvester Jones was not testifying as a security guard, 
but was testifying as an eye witness, present at the time of the 
shooting in question. Furthermore, Appellant never objected to 
Sylvester Jones1 testimony in regard to what he could and could not 
have done during the shooting. 
Gately's testimony was mere speculation, by his own admission. 
Whether or not mace, guns, nightsticks, or handcuffs were available, 
or armed guards or uniformed guards had been present, and whether 
such could have prevented any shooting, is all pure speculation. 
All of the same devices, as well as uniformed police, the Secret 
Service, the the FBI, did not prevent the shooting of Robert 
Kennedy in Los Angeles, or the attempted shooting of President Ford 
in Sacramento, California. 
The Court rightfully excluded the testimony of William Gately. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE OFFICER JAMES BURNS. 
Officer Burns testified that he was a vice officer employed 
by the Salt Lake City Police Department, and had been employed as a 
policeman for eight years. [R. 934] He testified that he was 
familiar with the customs and practices of the private clubs and 
private lodges in Salt Lake City. [R. 935] 
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He further testified that he had been in all of the private 
clubs and lodges in the Salt Lake City area and knew the customs 
and practices of the lodges and clubs as to security. [R. 935] He 
stated that he knew the customs and practices from his own experience 
and observations. [R. 935] 
He also testified that his official duties included the con-
tacting of the management of the private lodges and clubs and being 
familiar with their operation. [R. 936] He further testified that 
he was not aware of any instance where a private club or lodge 
hired a security guard. [R. 938] 
He further testified, by questions put to him by the Appellant, 
that it was a common practice for bartenders to handle such situations 
that might arise, and that in the case of fights, it was common 
practice for the bartender to call the police. [R. 939] 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide the following: 
Rule 49. HABIT OR CUSTOM TO PROVE SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR. 
Evidence of habit or custom is relevant to an 
issue of behavior on a specified occasion, but is 
admissible on that issue only as tending to prove 
that the behavior on such occasion conformed to the 
habit or custom. 
Rule 50. OPINION AND SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF BEHAVIOR 
TO PROVE HABIT OR CUSTOM. 
Testimony in the form of opinion is admissible 
on the issue of habit or custom. Evidence of specific 
instances of behavior is admissible to prove habit 
or custom if the evidence is of a sufficient number 
of such instances to warrant a finding of such 
habit or custom. 
Rule 56. TESTIMONY IN FORM OF OPINION. 
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert 
his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences 
is limited to such opinions or inferences as the 
judge finds (a) may be rationally based on the per-
ception of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear 
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understanding of his testimony or to the deter-
mination of the fact in issue. 
(2) If the witness is testifying as an expert, 
testimony of the witness in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to such opinions as the 
judge finds are (a) based on facts or data perceived by 
or personally known or made known to the witness at 
the hearing and (b) within the scope of the special 
knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed 
by the witness, 
(3) Unless the judge excludes the testimony he 
shall be deemed to have made the finding requisite 
to its admission. 
C4^ * * * * 
Officer Burns gave testimony as to custom and practice, as 
allowed by the Utah Rules of Evidence. His knowledge was based 
upon his own personal observations and experience and familiarity 
with each and every private lodge or club in Salt Lake City. Rule 
50, cited above, allows such testimony where the ffevidence is of a 
sufficient number of such instances to warrant a finding of such 
habit or custom." How could there be better evidence of custom 
and practice than the testimony of the police officer whose very 
duty was to deal with such private clubs and lodges, and who 
expressly stated he was personally familiar with the customs and 
practices of such lodges and clubs in regard to security measures. 
Appellant claims that Respondent did not offer Burns1 testimony 
as that of an expert. This is incorrect. Respondent stated that 
Officer Burns' expert testimony was offered as to custom and practice. 
[R. 686, 687] He did not, however, testify as an expert beyond that. 
As for the plaintiff's expert, William Gately, he could not 
give such testimony because he admitted he was a stranger to Salt 
Lake City, that he had no experience with the private clubs in Salt 
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Lake City, that his only experience had been with three private 
clubs in Portland, which had reputations for "getting out of hand" 
and which catered to young persons between the ages of 20 and 40. 
Furthermore, he could not name any lodges or clubs in Salt Lake 
City which utilized security guards. Such testimony could not 
possibly establish the customs and practices of private clubs and 
lodges in the Salt Lake Valley. 
The Appellant argues that since Officer Burns was allowed 
to testify, that William Gately should have been allowed to testify. 
However, that proposition does not legally nor logically follow. 
Each witness must qualify to testify. There was no foundation laid 
for the testimony of Gately in this case, hence his testimony was 
rightfully excluded. 
The Appellant further argues that the Court did not give a 
cautionary instruction in regard to Officer Burns1 testimony. 
However, the Appellant never requested such an instruction, nor 
did the Appellant, at any time, object that such an instruction was 
not given. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51, provide: 
. . . No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto . . . 
In McGinn v. Utah Power § Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974) 
where one party failed to object to the failure of the trial court 
to give a certain instruction, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
such failure to object results in a waiver. The Court stated: 
Besides, plaintiff's failure to object to the 
court's not giving the instruction mentioned 
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in 2) above was a waiver thereof under Rule 51, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The said Utah rule and the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the same are consistent with the rule of law in the surrounding 
states. See Nelson v. C § C Plywood Corp., 465 P.2d 314 (Mont. 1970); 
Bohlender v. Oster, 439 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1968); City of Scottsdale v. 
Kokaska, 17 Ariz. App. 120, 495 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1972); Frame v. 
Grisewood, 399 P.2d 450 (Nev. 1965); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad 
Co. v. French, 368 P.2d 652 (Okl. 1962); Fulton Insurance Co. v. 
White Motor Corp., 493 P.2d 138 (Ore. 1972); O'Brien v. Artz, 445 
P.2d 632 (Wash. 1968); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 
963 (Wyo. 1973). 
In any case, the Trial Court's Instruction No. 2 informed 
the jury that they were the exclusive judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and that they, the 
jury, had the right to judge the weight of the testimony and the 
credibility of the witnesses and the reasonableness of their statements 
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of James 
Burns was admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO ASK CERTAIN QUESTIONS REQUESTED OF PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS ON VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION IS NOT WELL TAKEN. 
Appellant claims the Trial Judge committed prejudicial error 
in refusing to ask certain questions of prospective jurors during 
voir dire examination as requested by the plaintiff. However, 
the Appellant did not designate in his Designation of Record on 
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Appeal that portion of the transcript covering the selection of 
the jury. It would be impossible to consider such question in 
this appeal. 
The Appellant apparently bases his objection upon a written 
word "No" which appears in the margin of Appellant's original 
voir dire request filed with the Court. There are no initials 
appearing by the word "No" and it is unknown who wrote such word 
upon the said request. 
Furthermore, it is Respondent's recollection that the Trial 
Court very fairly and thoroughly inquired of the jury as to all 
proper matters which enlightened all parties in order that any 
challenges could be made. It is also the Respondent's recollection 
that the Trial Court did inquire generally in the areas complained 
of by the Appellant. 
In the case cited by the Appellant, Kiernan v. Vanschaik, 
347 F.2d 775 (1965), the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
stated: 
The federal rules, which are substantially 
identical in civil and criminal cases, leave it 
to the discretion of the court whether the voir 
dire shall be entrusted to counsel or conducted 
by the court, and provide that in the latter 
event the court must permit such supplementary 
examination by counsel as it deems proper or 
shall itself submit such additional questions 
to the prospective jurors. Here in the manner 
in which the voir dire is conducted, the widest 
discretion necessarily is reposed in the trial 
judge. 
In our case, the questions may or may not have been put 
forth exactly in the wording requested by the Appellant, but it 
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is this Respondent's recollection that such questions were sub-
stantially given by the general inquiry made by the Court of the 
jury panel. 
The other case cited by Appellant, Crawford v. Manning, 
524 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975) has no application here. In that case, 
the Trial Judge made a statement to the jury panel whereupon one 
of the jurymen indicated that she had strong feelings regarding the 
matter, the Trial Judge refused to excuse her for cause, and was 
reversed by the Supreme Court. That case has no applicability here. 
Furthermore, the Appellant never objected at any time in 
regard to the manner in which the jury was selected. 
In any case, the Appellant has not shown any prejudice in 
the manner in which the jury panel was chosen. 
It is submitted that this issue, raised by the Appellant 
at this time for the first time, is not well taken. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 18, 32, 33, 34, 35, AND 36, OR BY REFUSING TO 
GIVE PLAINTIFF1S REQUESTS NO. 14, 15, 23, AND 26. 
Appellant claims the Trial Court committed prejudicial 
error in giving its Instructions No. 18, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36. 
However, a review of those instructions indicates otherwise. 
Court Instruction No. 18 dealt with the question of damages, 
and since the jury did not reach the question of damages as to 
Respondent, that instruction is immaterial to this appeal. 
Court Instruction No. 32 is a correct statement of the law. 
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The claims of the plaintiffs are dependent upon the acts of the 
deceased and any defenses thereto. 
Court Instruction No. 33 had application only to defendant 
Galveston Sonny Scott and not to the Respondent. Therefore, that 
instruction is immaterial in this appeal. 
Court Instruction No. 34 is a correct statement of the law. 
The reasonable, prudent man is judged not by hindsight, but by 
foresight. 
Court Instruction No. 35 is a correct statement of the law. 
One person who performs duties under the law has a right to assume 
that other persons will also perform their duties, unless warned 
to the contrary. 
Court Instruction No. 36 has already been discussed at 
length in Point I of both Briefs. 
Appellant further argues that the Court committed prejudicial 
error in failing to give Requested Instructions No. 14, 15, 23, and 
26. However, a review of those instructions indicates otherwise. 
The Plaintiff1s Requested Instruction No. 14 was essentially 
given by the Court in other instruction. Defendant's duty was to 
be reasonably diligent and to exercise such watchfulness and caution 
as circumstances required. Court Instruction No. 10 covered this. 
Furthermore, the said requested instruction, as drafted, contained 
words concerning the duties of those doing dangerous acts. There 
is no evidence that the Respondents did any dangerous acts. Such 
instruction would have been improper. 
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Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 15 was given in 
substance by the Trial Court's Instructions No. 10, No. 15, No. 34, 
and No. 35. Furthermore, the said instruction requested by the 
plaintiff to the effect that "a person is liable for all of the 
natural and probable consequences of his actM is incorrect. A 
person is liable only for his acts which are negligent, and then 
only if the proximate cause of an accident. It would have been 
prejudicial error to give this instruction. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 23 was given in 
substance. Court Instruction No. 30 stated that although the 
Lodge was a non-profit, charitable, and benevolent association, 
it could still be held liable for its negligent acts, like any other 
private person or corporation. Furthermore, Court Instruction 
No. 17 stated the Lodge to be responsible for the acts or omissions 
of its officers, trustees, and members of the New Year's Eve 
committee. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 26 was given by the 
Court in its Instructions No. 10, No 15, and No. 34. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant's claim 
that the Court committed prejudicial error in regard to the instruc-
tions as stated above is not well taken. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court did not 
commit any prejudicial error as claimed by the Appellant, but 
that the testimony was fairly and rightfully admitted into or 
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excluded from evidence, and that the jury was properly 
instructed by the Court, and that after due deliberation, the 
jury returned a just unanimous verdict, which should be affirmed, 
2 £&-_ day of June, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, WADSWORTH § RUSSON 
l. RUSSDN 
Attorneys for Defendant^Respondent 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of 
the foregoing Respondent's Brief to James A. Mcintosh, James 
A. Mcintosh § Associates, Attorneys for Appellant, 525 South 
300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to Ron Eubanks, 
Attorney for Defendant, Galveston Sonny Scott, 250 East Third 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 7 ^ day of June, 1976. 
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